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. prmclple for the 21st Century He suggests that today's generation IS no more aware of the historical lmpllcatlon of Bill Clmton's decision than his generation was of Haq Truman's m 1950 The Clinton Doctrme essentially IS a response to the threat of WMD and a statement of the wlllmgness of the United States "to shoulder the prmclpal responslblllty for then containment " While the United States, ideally, would prefer to contam WMD with the ad of multmatlonal orgamzatlons, "the United States will act alone if necessary " In closing, Tramor suggests that the President's legacy "will not be sex and scandal, rather it will be the Clinton Doctrine "'
The Thesis of this Paper: A Strategy of Homeland Defense
The Clinton Doctrine, m its current form, 1s not a finished piece of strategic art First, its mltlal and preponderant focus rests explicitly on other nation states, it 1s not focused adequately on subnational entitles Second, as an emerging concept the Doctrine lacks an effective underlying strategy which successfully integrates this nation's resources and power mto a cohesive and effective framework that deals not only with threats from other nation states, but with subnational threats, as well Today, the overwhelmmg focus of our nation's WMD effort IS directed against WMD threats emanating from other nation states, and msufflclent emphasis 1s placed on WhlD threats posed by subnational entitles .
-prmclpally terronst groups Absent an enlarged scope and effective supportmg strategy, the Clinton Doc$ne will not achieve its ultimate goal of protecting the American people and their homeland from WMD threats This nation needs to address this shortfall and begin to structure a new innovative strategy which effectively will integrate our nation's resources to thwart the subnational WYID threat The author of this paper suggests that the post-Cold War orgamzmg prmclple for our national secunty interests should be a "strategy of homeland defense "
The challenge facing the United States national security community IS to fmd a solution to the WYlD threat facing our nation Speclflcally, this paper focuses on the threat from subnational entitles and proposes an mltlal and broad strategic framework on how the United States can integrate its avalable national power and resources mto an effective strategy that will thwart the use of WMD against our homeland The Clinton Doctrine IS a start. but to keep Amenca safe m the 21st Century, the Doctrine needs an underlying and supportive strategy for countermg subnational WMD threats The challenge of this paper IS to prompt the reader to abandon the status quo, "busmess as usual" approach to national security and consider a new perspective, a new paradigm, and a new strategic framework In addition, this author hopes that the reader will become more aware of the nontradltlonal character of the 21st Century, and that this paper will stimulate further discussion and debate on how best to deal with the subnational WMD threat Ultimately. the objective of the paper IS to force people to consider the lmphcatlons and consequences of inaction and to prompt others to take action -while time remains to do so .
Some Assumptions
This paper 1s based on several assumptions 1) A cohesltely integrated and effective strategy to deal with potential subnational W-MD threats to our homeland IS needed if the U S hopes to defend its people from attack 2) The failure or lack of resolve to develop an effective strategy IS unacceptable m the face of the WMD threat which exists today
We cannot simply throw up our hands and accept the mevltabllrty of a WMD attack on our people and our homeland 3) Nontradltlonal threats require a nontradltlonal approach (read as strategy) 4) The WMD genie 1s out of the bottle and can not be put back mto the bottle 5) Overall, our nation IS not adequately prepared to respond to a WMD terrorist event 6) The risk of an actual attack IS much greater than that currently acknowledged 7:1 Subnatlonal actors will use indirect and asymmetric approaches to confront a technologically superior superpower such as the United States They will mdu-ectly attack our nation with WMD at our most vulnerable point -our cities 8:
Finally, a successful subnational WMD attack may cause the American people to completely reassess their interests, objectives, and strategies, and may result m a strong movement towards lsolatromsm, which could result m the loss of world stability What impact will this have on the mternatlonal system and world polltlcs? As one can imagine, use of WMD may have far-reaching lmpllcatlons The current assessment of the risk, this author will argue, should be reexamined We must ask ourselves how much risk we can tolerate The answer to that question will have a slgmflcant influence on the means that this nation will devote to countermg the WMD threat Heretofore, our nation has accepted, m this author's vie\\, too much risk -counting on the hope that a massive WMD attack \+111 not occur, and hoping that our good luck will contmue Many national security analysts declare it a given that 111s impossible to protect the American homeland from subnatlonaL,WMD attack Even General Tramor suggests, "it IS almost impossible .
to protect against them " This author argues that waiting for the next "Pearl Harbor" to occur before taking the appropriate action IS not a responsible approach to protecting the Katlonal Security m the 21 st Century" focused on the long-term issues facing our national security To meet the challenges, the KDP Report su,, Ocested that 'fundamental change to R our national security mstltutlons, mlhtary strategy, and defense posture" 1s required The report did not attempt "to provide all the ansa ers " Rather, its intent was "to stimulate a L wider debate on our defense priorities and the need for a transformation to meet the challenges" facing our nation Such a debate "1s crltlcal m bulldmg the necessary support of the Congress and American people for the extensive changes that must be made "'
The NDP Report argues for the need to "launch a transformation strategy now that will enable it to meet a range of security challenges " The Panel Report treated the threat to the Amencan homeland from WMD as only one of many threats 3 This paper, however, 1s limited m scope and focuses on the threat of WMD by subnational terrorist groups agamst the American homeland and suggests an mltlal strategic approach to counter it This author argues that the most significant threat to our people and our homeland m the next twenty years will come from subnational terrorist threats -emanatmg both from abroad and internally from wlthm the U S The strategic framework IS not intended to be "the" solution nor IS the framework meant to be "the" answer, rather, it 1s provided to stimulate further debate and mvestlgatlon Inherent m this discussion IS an lmphclt warning Absent a new and effective strategy , it IS merely a question of time before a potential nightmare scenario as outlined m Appendix A of this paper, or a slmllarly horrlflc attack. occurs
If the message of this paper 1s to be understood, the reader must be able to think m abstractions and to understand the potential for terrible and shocking events The author 1s calling upon the reader to be creatll e, to see beyond the past and the llmltatlons of the present. to sense new opportumtles, and to engage m the debate and offer new ideas The r author's goal 1s to mspu-e others to think nontradltlonally and to ponder about a nontraditional future *
The American People Must Be Included in the Debate
The debate must not be limited to the national secunty "elite" of this country The issues, the risks. and the stakes involved must be shared with the American people, most importantly, the American people must be part of the debate To date, mamstream
Americans have not been sensitized adequately to the subnational WIMD terrorist challenges they face They have been overlooked and not engaged effectively and actively m this debate It 1s time to tell the people the unsettling truth about the fate that, according to many knowledgeable offlclals, awaits them It 1s the people who have the most to lose if their government does not serve then-interests The people are, and always will be. an integral part of the Clausewltzlan "trmlty" of government, nuhtary, and citizens Ultimately, if the debate 1s successful. it will be the people who will bring about the changes m our government's operations and structure necessary to protect the population's security If for no other reason, the people must be brought mto the debate for it 1s they who will have to pay to implement the new required strategy If the public 1s not actively involved and convinced of the threat, it will be difficult to obtain the necessary resources to fund a strategy Over the past decade the trend has been to spend less on defense From 1987 to 1996.
there was a 34 percent reduction m spending on national defense During the same timeframe. -defense and foreign affairs spending fell from 6 9 percent of GDP to 3 7 percent The admmlstratlon proposal would reduce that to 3 0 percent m FY 2002 Of c that, defense spending would be 2 8 percent of GDP -its lowest level since the 1930's "' Clearly, slgmflcant reductions have been made m defense costs Th,e question that must be included m the debate IS, "how much can we continue to cut and still defend our people and our homeland 7" This nation can afford to spend more on defense, but there must be a recogmtlon of the threat and an appreciation of the risks of inaction -and perhaps more importantly -the people themselves must have the will to pay the necessary costs The people must be mkolved d there IS to be an increase of resources targeted against the subnational WMD threat
The Key to Change: The Ameman People
There IS time to take the necessary actions required to address our nation's vulnerability to terronst attack However, there must be a groundswell of public support and pohtlcal will to invest the necessary resources, reshape and forge new bureaucratic relationships wlthm the government, and fundamentally change our national security mfrastructure and defense strategy The American people are the key to change If all pohtlcs are local, as Tip O'Nelil su ggested, then the Members of Congress must feel the urgency to act from the people Slmllarly, the people must influence the President to use the bully pulpit of the President's Office and provide the leadership necessary to do what S needs to be done The American people are the targets of the terrorist, and it 1s they a ho will suffer if appropriate steps are not taken to protect them
The Government Must Uphold Its Duty to the American People ta
The people must receive the protection they deserve from those m government service who are sworn to be bound by and to support the Constltutlon of the United States It 1s i useful to review some fundamental elements of both the Declaration of Independence' and the U S Constltutlon 6 It 1s after all, m reference to the government, the "right of the people to alter it," and to focus on orgamzmg its powers m such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness " Let us never forget that the government was created by the people "m order to insure domestic tranqullhty.
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty " After reviewing some of the statements and fmdmgs contained m this paper, one may question whether the way m which the executive department of the government 1s organized, resourced, and conducts its operations to safeguard America from subnational %'-MD terrorist attack will guarantee the peoples' unalienable rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness " The NDP Report acknowledges the threat from WMD to our homeland The report states "our current course 1s unlikely to produce the m&ary capablhtles necessary to meet the range of challenges we foresee we believe that the current and planned structure, doctrme, and strategy -that 1s to say, our current security arrangements -will not be adequate to meeting the challenges of the future The force structure of the future must have the ability to respond effectively to the use of weapons of mass destruction * The threat of a terrorist group using a nuclear blologlcal, or chemical weapon of mass destruction m the Umted States IS real It LS not a matter of 'tf'but rather %&en" such an event will occur * Goverzzment efforts of tlze Federal, state and local level need to be betrer coordznated to respond to such events despite Improvements from the recently issued Presidential Declslon Du-ectn'e 39 * Intelligence is our best and first line of defense against terrorism. but problems of coordznatzon aad rzzformation sharing among agencies still appear to cozztznue despite recent efforts to resolve them m * The local government entzties such as fire, polzce, ambulance, rescue and emergencv rooms, who will be called to respond m the first critical hours of a WMD terrorist mcldenLare generally znadequately trazned azzd ill-equipbed to handle the difficult challenges posed by WMD incidents * Our ability to respond to a nuclear inczdent, although slgmficantly improbed wlthm the last two years, still needs greater attentiozz azzd increased financial support * The use of chemical and biologzcal weapons, IN A CIVILIAN SETTIhlG, wlzzch most experts agree is more lzkelv, presents unique problems and requu-ements that do not appear to be adequate& addressed under current Federal polzcies and progranzs * Overall urzding needs to be increased to prepare for the consequences of a WMD terrorist inczdent, especially for Jomt trammg and field exercises One could argue that our nation's approach to national security and our national military strategy are too focused on threats from other sovereign nation states While this writer does not suggest that we can afford to ignore the threats posed by other nation states, he does however, ask the reader to pause and reflect on whether we have the balance right today. and whether the declslons we make today will protect our homeland m the future This author suggests that a new paradigm 1s needed with 1% hlch to understand the changing world-m which we live, and the subnatlonal WMD terrorist threats our nation b faces It 1s not an all or nothing approach, rather, it 1s a suggestion that a new paradigm 1s needed which acknowledges that both the world and the subnatlona) threats our natlon faces are m transltlon It 1s a world where traditional threats from nation states still exist, however, it 1s also a world \\ here non-nation state actors threaten our nation, as well
This writer suggests that a strategy dealing with the subnatlonal terronst threat will require a new framework for understandmg and dealing with the world Adoption of a new framework may lead to the reahzatlon that our nation's current structures, orgamzatlons, relationship, laws, and resource allocations require slgmflcant change The paradigm 1s yet to be finalized Indeed, the action of focusmg on the need for, and development of, a new integrated, cohesive strategy that deals with subnatlonal W-MD threats to our homeland will lead to that new paradigm Undoubtedly, there will be resistance to the adoption of a new perspective and framework for understanding and dealing with the subnatlonal WMD threat Some crmcs will argue that our nation 1s m fact prepared to deal with the subnatlonal WMD threat and they will support the status quo Others may default to a "it's too hard to think about and too hard to do anything about" posmon Some cntlcs, who can not move beyond the status quo, may argue that traditional concepts will prevent radical change For example, Serious attention must be given to the civil rights issues raised when rights of mdlvlduals conflict with the necessity to protect our nation from attack These competmg interests must be lscussed and debated openly Ultimately, it will be the responslblllty of our elected offlclals at the Federal, State, and local levels to reconcile the competing interests m a democratic and constltutlonally compliant process Clearly, the Supreme
Court may have to be mvolved m this issue Wlthout questlon, a new approach to mtelhgence oversight will be part of the debate to guarantee that abuses are not permitted
Critics may argue that the Intelligence Commumty ~111 never achieve the required capablhtles to support the new strategy However, the author requests these critics focus their energy on determmmg how we can overcome current shortfalls and achieve the new required capablhtles There are slgmficant challenges involved and it ~111 be a tough Job for the Intelligence Comrnumty to accomphsh these tasks However, the alternative of inaction will lead to consequences that are not Suclear deterrence worked well durmg the Cold War The challenge now 1s to develop a new deterrence theory that speclflcally focuses on deterring subnatlonal entitles from using WMD against the American homeland Deterrence 1s an essential element of the new strategic framework for dealing with the subnatlonal WMD threat A great deal of effort must be given to the development of an effective approach to deterrence According to U S Jomt Pub l-02 deterrence IS "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences Deterrence 1s a state of mmd brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction "" This 1s the tradtlonal approach to deterrence, however, deterrmg subnatlonal actors will requn-e a new theory of deterrence l and a ne\\ revolutionary approach to make it viable Yontradltlonal threats ~111 require nontradmonal solutions Nowhere else 1s this more true than with the issue of deterring the use of W-MD by subnatlonal orgamzatlons Risk, fear and uncertainty are at the heart of deterrence Our new deterrence theory must, at a mmlmum, use the concepts of risk, w reward. uncertamty, and fear to deter potential terrorists Alan Zlmm wrote an excellent article entitled "Deterrence Baslt Theory, Prmclples, and Impllcatlons"'" which contams an approach to deterrence that may well serve as a point of departure for our development of an effecti\ e deterrence theory He argues that the concept of deterrence must be reexamined m light of the changing security environment, and believes that the correct approach may lead to a safer, more secure world Zlmm suggests that the traditional defmltlon of deterrence 1s inadequate and requires expansion
Zunm argues that the key to deterrence 1s to get the declslonmaker to answer "no" to either the primary question, or one or more of three secondary questions The primary question 1s "Will the action be successful 3" The secondary questlons are "Will it cost too much"", "Can the gams be retamed'", and "What else 1s at risk -can I protect my other vital assets from risk of capture or destruction, the value of which exceeds the value of the goaY' Zlmm suggests that the DOD defmltlon of deterrence should be revised to "Deterrence 1s causing an adversary or potential adversary to decide against takmg a specific action or actions Deterrence 1s a state of mmd brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction, the perception that the cost of the aggression will exceed any possible gam, and/or the perception that the action(s) would not be successful *' All four of his deterrence strategies are contained m his new defmltlon These strategies are Capability Denial ("Will it succeed?"j. Acqulsltlon Cost ( Will it cost too much 7"' Takeback (' Can the gams be retamed7":1, and Asset Hostage ,,
('What else 1s at risk?") Zlmm 1s on the right track, but more thought and attention must be given to the development of a new deterrence theory to deter subnatronal actors I
One reason Cold U'ar deterrence worked was that the theory and pohcy were public
Our deterrence pohcy was declared openly to the world Although there was some * amblgulty about our pohcy, there was no uncertainty about our nation's capability to carry it out Our forces were robust and our resolve was strong Today, there 1s no public, openly stated deterrence pohcy directed to deter subnatlonal actors Nor do we share with the world details of our operational capablhtles to carry out our deterrence pohcy Too much 1s left unssud, and there 1s too much ambiguity This lack of clarity on our intentions and capablhtles does not create the condltlons for deterrence that Zmxn outlmes Remember, the goal 1s to get the subnatlonal declslonmaker to answer "no" to the primary question and the secondary questions Therefore, once a deterrence theory 1s developed it 1s an essential part of the proposed new strategy to make it public It must be understood by all subnatlonal orgamzatlons m the world It 1s anticipated that our deterrence policy will require a preemption and mterdlctlon capablllty Therefore, it must be a matter of public knowledge that the C S will, to protect its vital interest, send operational forces anywhere m the world to preempt an attack on its homeland
It may be prudent to make it public knowledge that any subnatlonal attack agamst the U S homeland that 1s state sponsored will result with attacks on both the subnatlonal actor and the state that sponsored it Support of a "zero tolerance" pohcy agamst WMD use against the American homeland will require timely and decisive retaliation Our intent to retaliate must be made public and be part of our declared deterrence pohcy The U S must be able to lmk retaliation, if deterrence falls, to the nation state that supported subnatlonal states We must publicly put the world on notice that any linkage will result v m the U S using its entire spectrum of national power and resources m retaliationranging from dlplomatlc response to the use of our nuclear arsenal The goal of such a I pohcy 1s to deter nation states from sponsormg subnatlonal groups and to reinforce m their minds that they will be held accountable if they decide to do so 4. Development of Effective Counterterrorist "Prevention" Capabilities that Permit Preemption and Interdiction.
Hand m hand with a new deterrence theory 1s the requirement for counterterrorlst capablhtles that will allow our nation to preempt preparations being made by a subnatlonal entity This capability will permit the proJection of force anywhere m the world to preempt an attack on the United States Here again, mtelhgence 1s absolutely critical It 1s anticipated that this capability may require consultation with foreign governments and/or multmatlonal orgamzatlons prior to lmplementatlon However, it can be anticipated that m some cases the U S will conduct a preemption operation unilaterally and without any advance notice given to other nations Certain contmgencles may require extraordinary measures To meet this requirement, extraordinary cooperation must exist between the Department of Defense and the domestic law enforcement community In addition, the groundwork for preemptive operations m other sovereign states must begin now Our intent to conduct such operations must be an integral part of our publicly declared deterrence pol1c> Terrorists must know that there 1s no place where they can safely plan and from which they can launch an attack on the United States, nor 1s there any place they can hide from our nation's worldwide reach Both dome&c law enforcement orgamzatlons and the Department of pefense will have to train and equip for this mission It 1s suggested that the U S Special Operations Command be given this mission within the Department of Defense b Serious conslderatlon should be given to reconstltutlng the ability of the CLA to carryout a full range of covert operations overseas 1n order to support this mission Enhanced and effective coordlnatlon with domestic law enforcement agencies will be necessary. as well Capab111tles that ~111 permit the lnterdlctlon of an unfolding subnational WMD attack on the U S are required In such a time-cntlcal situation there 1s no time available to deal with turf battles between the domestic law enforcement community and the Department of Defense's Special Operations Forces In the execution phase of an attack, some aspects may be unfolding concurrently both overseas and domestically In such a scenario. there will be a requirement for Joint capab111tles akm to Joint rmlltary operations 1n the Department of Defense Both Defense Department and law enforcement agencies must be able to execute seamless, Joint operations 1n order to expedltlously interdict an unfolding attack on the United States Current policies, bureaucratic boundaries, laws, and communlcatlon barriers ~111 hamper integrated operations These obstacles to successful lnterdlctlon operations must be overcome as part of a new strategy Preemption operations should focus on the "center of graklty" of subnational organlzatlons A tradltlonal definition of center of gravity 1s "those charactenstlcs, capablhtles, or localltles from which a m111tary force derives 1ts freedom of action, physlcal strength, or w111 to fight "" The debate ~111. it 1s hoped, de\ elop a new defmltlon of center of gravity with regard to subnational entltles Again, once we understand the concept better as It applies to subnatlonal groups. the mtelhgence commumty must be redlrected to identify what it 1s for each potential and actual WMD e subnatlonal threat The real value of a center of gravity approach may be m its ability to focus our planning efforts, and our mtelhgence efforts Agam, the key IS to focus on the threat and integrate our natlon's resources and means efflclently and effectively Conslderatlon also should be given to the use of other instruments of national power to preempt subnational groups Polmcal, dlplomatlc, and economic instruments should be To reiterate, it should be widely known that the United States possesses an integrated target list on subnatlonal actors and has weapons targeted on "then vital interest" and on the assets they hold dear There can be no doubt m the mmds of any potential terrorists that they can achieve then political obJectlves through terrorist attack on the Amencan homeland The terrorists must know m advance that the costs will be too high, and must know that they can not retam any gams from the use of WMD They must know that they a 111 suffer certam destruction and all they value will be destroyed This should be the objective of our retahatlon and it should be declared publicly It 1s Interesting to reflect on the fact that the actual SIOP of the Cold War was more than Just a database, but it also-was a process that slgmflcantly impacted the structure and The law enforcement community must change and difficult issues mvolvmg its roles and responslbllltles must be addressed New mnovatlve approaches and solutions must be found to ensure that the law enforcement community 1s capable of addressing the subnatlonal threat The law enforcement community currently 1s focused on the collection of evidence and the prosecution of crlmmals This emphasis may, m some instances, have a negative impact on a counterterrorlst mlsslon The law enforcement community, due prlmarlly to Its concern with the handling of evidence and its effect on River on Roosevelt Bridge They turn left off Constltutlon Avenue and park then-car m a pubhc parkmg space on the Ellipse They quickly walk to a nearby phone booth and report that the dbject has been dehvered They walk to the nearby -Metro ;ubn a) and \+lthm a few minutes are at Reagan Xatlonal Alrport After a short wait, they board a plane that will take them to Philadelphia where they will catch a connecting flight to London's Heathrow Airport When the nuclear device goes off they will be on board a
United Airlines 777 crulsmg at 36,003 feet halfway over the Atlantic :Tlze Bzologzcal Attack) The terrorists executing the blologlcal attacks on the three ,4mencan cmes \I 111 not fare as well as the two heading for London All three understand that they will be infected by the agents that they release mto the air over the American cmes later m the evening They not only accept then fate but they relish the opportumty to be part of an operation that will mfhct terror and destruction on the American people which to be released -it was dark and the temperature was appropnate All three terrorists ~~111 die from exposure to the agents Yet. theJ are aware that the effects of the agents will not begin to appear immediately Therefore. they will quickly dispose of the containers, quietly exit the bmldmgs undetected, and wait for the effects to take place
The Effects of the Attack (Dalr One) The effects of the nuclear device m Washington, DC have completely destroyed a circular area with a radius of 3/4 of a n-ule to a mile from the spot the The Wammg CSK, operating out of Atlanta, received and broadcasted a message from an anonymous source The message reads, "You do not know from whence the attack on your homeland came We are a subnatlonal terrorist group, hidden within a sovereign nation state We are not a state supported group We are representative of a new actor on the mtematlonal stage to be reckoned with We can attack you anytime we wish These are our two demands 1 :I Focus on your own country and its ou n mtemal needs Engage yourself 2) Don't involve yo&self m the affan-s of others outslde your borders Don't engage the rest of the world m pursuit of your own parochial interests If you do not heed this request, we will attack you again"' 40
